Controlled Substances and the Second Amendment: A Blurred Constitutional Line
At the heart of United States v. Hemani lies a fundamental constitutional question: What is the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection, and when may the federal government lawfully restrict firearm possession? This question reflects the constitutional tension between individual Second Amendment rights and federal public-safety regulation. The issue in United States v. Hemani is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal statute that “prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment as applied to the respondent. [1]
In United States v. Hemani, the Supreme Court has not yet issued a decision, but the outcome could significantly affect Americans who use controlled substances and lawfully own firearms. The case centers on Ali Danial Hemani, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal statute that prohibits firearm possession by anyone who is an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” [2] Two federal agents discovered approximately two ounces of cannabis, and the government further alleged that Hemani had used cocaine and promethazine, though those substances were not included in the indictment. [3] Under federal law, Texas does not permit adult-use or comprehensive medical cannabis, and cannabis remains classified as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act. [4] As a result, the government deemed Hemani an unlawful user and sought to impose a firearms prohibition under § 922(g)(3). [5] The indictment also alleged that Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while also being an unlawful user of controlled substances. [6] The statute forbids any “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing firearms; however, the term “unlawful user” is not defined within the statute itself. [7] However, the pistol was located in the closet of his parents’ home. [8]
Hemani’s attorneys argue that applying this provision is unconstitutional because there is no historical justification for disarming an individual who was sober at the time of possession based solely on cannabis use. Notably, the indictment does not allege that Hemani was intoxicated, dangerous, or engaged in criminal conduct with the firearm when it was discovered. [9] This ambiguity raises a further question: Who, precisely, qualifies as an “unlawful user” in the eyes of the federal government?
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to possess a firearm for lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home, independent of service in a state-run militia. [10] This interpretation clarified that the Amendment applies not only to collective militia service but also to individual citizens seeking to exercise their right to keep and bear arms. [11] However, the Court emphasized that this right is not unlimited. The Heller decision acknowledged the constitutionality of certain longstanding regulations, including prohibitions on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill, laws restricting firearms in sensitive places, and conditions on the commercial sale of firearms. In doing so, the Court recognized that the government may lawfully disarm certain categories of people. Two years later, McDonald v. The City of Chicago extended the holding of Heller to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [12] The Court held that the right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, particularly self-defense, is a fundamental right applicable to state and local governments. [13]
In 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen. In a 6–3 ruling, the Court struck down New York’s century-old public-carry licensing law. [14] The Court further stated that the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a loaded handgun in public for self-defense and concluded that New York’s public-carry law, which required residents to demonstrate “proper cause” to obtain a concealed-carry license, violated this newly declared Second Amendment right. [15]
Additionally, the Court announced a new test for lower courts to use when considering Second Amendment challenges to federal, state, and local gun laws. [16] Previously, courts had almost universally applied balancing tests to Second Amendment challenges, weighing the government’s public-safety interests that support reasonable gun laws against an individual’s Second Amendment rights. [17] The new test states: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” [18]
As a result, these interest-balancing tests would no longer be relied upon by courts, and firearm regulations must instead be consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation. Bruen complicates modern statutes such as § 922(g)(3) because controlled-substance and intoxication laws lack clear historical analogues, particularly in eighteenth-century law. [19] This issue is central to United States v. Hemani, as comparisons to historical practices, provide no clear answer for how the case should be resolved, which explains the many questions surrounding the statute’s constitutionality.
The government argues that individuals who use controlled substances are inherently dangerous and therefore may be disarmed, consistent with public-safety concerns. In contrast, the defense contends that the statute imposes an impermissible status-based restriction that is inconsistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. [20] According to Hemani’s attorneys, temporary drug use has never justified permanent disarmament, particularly where there is no allegation that the defendant was intoxicated, dangerous, or actively using a firearm at the time of the alleged drug use. [21]
This dispute directly implicates the broader constitutional question concerning how much the Second Amendment can be protected and who the government can restrict from possessing a firearm. In this case, the government seeks to exclude individuals it deems “unlawful users” of controlled substances from Second Amendment protection, even when those individuals are not intoxicated at the time of firearm possession. However, under the framework established in Bruen, there is no clear historical analogue supporting such a restriction, nor is the term “unlawful user” precisely defined. [22] As a result, Hemani exposes a blurred constitutional line, raising serious questions about the limits of federal authority to regulate firearm possession under the Second Amendment. [23]
There are historical analogues for disarming individuals who are intoxicated while actively using weapons; however, individuals like Hemani, who was not actively using the firearm he possessed, are being placed into the same category as those engaging in dangerous conduct. [24] As a result, defendants such as Hemani are subjected to restrictions that do not clearly fit their circumstances. This case also carries broader implications depending on how the Supreme Court rules. If § 922(g)(3) is upheld, it raises questions about the scope of other categorical bans on firearm possession. Conversely, if the statute is struck down, it prompts questions about what alternative tools Congress may rely upon to regulate firearm possession under the Second Amendment and related federal statutes. Ultimately, the Court’s decision in United States v. Hemani may redefine the extent to which the federal government can regulate firearm possession consistent with the Second Amendment.
Sources
“US v. Hemani,” American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/cases/us-v-hemani.
Jacob Charles, “Breaking down the Hemani Arguments,” Duke Center for Firearms Law, March 4, 2026, https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2026/03/breaking-down-the-hemani-arguments.
“Overview of United States v. Hemani: Cannabis Regulation & Federal Law,” American Bar Association, Feb. 3, 2026, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/resources/committee-articles/overview-us-v-hemani/.
Ibid.
Ibid.
United States v. Hemani (No. 24-1234).
Natalie C. Diaz, “Guns, Cannabis, and the Constitution: SCOTUS to Hear United States v. Hemani on Cannabis Use and Gun Ownership,” Mandelbaum Barrett PC, October 20, 2025, https://mblawfirm.com/insights/guns-cannabis-and-the-constitution-scotus-to-hear-united-states-v-hemani-on-cannabis-use-and-gun-ownership/.
United States v. Hemani.
Natalie Diaz, “Guns, Cannabis, and the Constitution.”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Ibid.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Ibid.
“Giffords Law Center Condemns Ahistorical, Extremist Ruling from Supreme Court Conservatives in Bruen,” Giffords Law Center, June 23, 2022, https://giffords.org/press-release/2022/06/giffords-law-center-condemns-ahistorical-extremist-ruling-from-supreme-court-conservatives-in-bruen/.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Jacob Charles, “Breaking down the Hemani Arguments.”
Natalie Diaz, “Guns, Cannabis, and the Constitution.”
“United States v. Ali Danial Hemani,” Legal Information Institute, 2026, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/24-1234.
Natalie Diaz, “Guns, Cannabis, and the Constitution.”
“United States v. Ali Danial Hemani,” Legal Information Institute.