The Legal Fallout of “Not Like Us”
Nia Mclean
On January 15, 2025, rapper Aubrey “Drake” Graham filed a lawsuit against his record label, Universal Music Group Recordings, Inc. (UMG), alleging defamation, defamation per se, harassment in the second degree, and violation of New York General Business Law § 349. [1] The lawsuit stems from Kendrick Lamar’s diss track “Not Like Us,” which repeatedly accuses Drake of sexual misconduct with minors. [2] However, rather than suing Lamar, Drake’s complaint focuses on UMG’s role in distributing and promoting the track, arguing that the label knowingly published and profited from defamatory allegations: “This lawsuit is … entirely about UMG, the music company that decided to publish, promote, exploit, and monetize allegations that it understood were not only false, but dangerous,” the complaint states. [3]
At the heart of the lawsuit is Drake’s claim of defamation per se, a legal doctrine that applies when false statements are so inherently damaging that the plaintiff does not need to prove specific harm. [4] To succeed, Drake must establish that UMG made or distributed a false statement of fact, published it to a third party, caused harm, and—because he is a public figure—acted with actual malice, meaning UMG either knew the statement was false or showed reckless disregard for the truth. [5] The lawsuit alleges that the defamatory material includes the song itself and the accompanying album cover and video. [6] The lyrics contain sexual-assault accusations, including, “say, Drake, I hear you like ’em young,” “certified Lover Boy? Certified pedophiles,” and “tryna strike a chord and it’s probably A minor.” [7] The lawsuit argues that these statements are reasonably understood to imply that Drake is a pedophile. [8] Additionally, the album cover features an image of his home marked with icons resembling those used by law enforcement to identify sex offenders on public registries, reinforcing the alleged defamatory message. [9]
The lawsuit also alleges that “Not Like Us” incited violence against Drake. It cites lyrics such as “I think that Oakland show gon’ be your last stop.” [10] Drake’s lawsuit argues that this line constitutes a direct threat. The complaint claims that UMG, by promoting the track, knowingly circulated a song that encouraged retaliation against him. [11] According to Drake, the consequences of UMG’s actions were not just theoretical—he experienced real-world harm, including an attack at his Toronto residence, [12] an increase in threats, [13] and a decline in public favorability. [14]
By framing UMG’s actions as a deliberate attempt to profit from defamatory material, rather than merely distributing an artist’s work, Drake’s lawsuit raises broader legal and ethical questions about the responsibility of record labels in artist disputes. Are music labels responsible for the content that their artists publish?
In a memorandum supporting its motion to dismiss Drake’s case, UMG raises a critical point about diss tracks and Drake’s own part in the feud, noting that “hyperbolic and metaphorical language is part for the course in diss tracks” [15] and “Drake has been pleased to use UMG’s platform to promote tracks leveling similarly incendiary attacks at Lamar.” [16] UMG argues that “Instead of accepting the loss like the unbothered rap artist he often claims to be, he has sued his own record label in a misguided attempt to salve his wounds.” [17]
This argument relies upon the “Clean Hands” doctrine, which says that a party seeking equitable relief must not have engaged in misconduct related to the subject of the claim. [18] In other words, one cannot claim harm from actions that they themselves have participated in. Drake has released multiple diss tracks of his own in response to “Not Like Us”—most notably, “Family Matters.” [19] UMG’s position is that by participating in the diss-track battle, Drake cannot now claim defamation from the same context.
The debate over whether artistic expression can constitute defamation is not new, and it recently resurfaced in the criminal context with the Young Thug RICO trial, where prosecutors sought to use rap lyrics as evidence of criminal intent. [20] Drake advocated against using rap lyrics as evidence, during Young Thug’s RICO trial. “Notably, less than three years ago,” UMG says in its memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss the lawsuit filed on March 17, 2025, “Drake himself signed a public petition criticizing ‘the trend of prosecutors using artists’ creative expression against them’ by treating rap lyrics as literal fact.” [21] Now, the label argues, Drake is doing just that.
Defamation requires a statement to be a factual assertion, not opinion or rhetorical exaggeration. [22] In New York, courts use a three-part test: (1) whether the language has a precise meaning, (2) whether it can be proven true or false, and (3) whether the context signals it as opinion. [23] The Supreme Court ruled in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler that statements of “rhetorical hyperbole” are not actionable facts and thus not defamatory. [24]
UMG argues that the allegedly defamatory material is opinion, citing precedent establishing that exaggerated, inflammatory language in entertainment or public discourse does not constitute defamation. [25] In Sandals Resort Int’l v. Google, a New York state court ruled that statements reflecting “a degree of anger and resentment” may indicate that they are nonactionable opinions. [26] While courts have generally protected creative works under the First Amendment, the question of whether a diss track contains verifiable defamatory statements remains unsettled. However, in Rapaport v. Barstool Sports, a diss track filled with insults and accusations was deemed rhetorical hyperbole, not a factual assertion. [27]
The diss track resulted from “one of ‘the nastiest lyrical warfare rap [feuds]’ in recent history [brackets in original].” [28] Given this context, UMG asserts that no reasonable listener would interpret the lyrics as factual allegations. [29] The memorandum also mentions the photoshopped album cover featuring Drake’s home covered in sex offender markers, stating that no reasonable person would interpret it as a genuine public registry listing. [30]
How can a plaintiff prove that people believe the alleged defamatory statements? Drake’s suit cites several tweets referring to the “Not Like Us” album cover, including one saying, “ ‘Yoooooo Sex offenders have to register Red means sexual assault against a minor. Drake has 13 of them living in his house?’ ” and another reading “Respect and love you Kendrick for keeping it [100 emoji]. From your tone, anger, and passion behind your words there is no doubt on my end that Drake is indeed a pedophile.” [31]
Why would UMG want to damage the reputation of one of its most popular and profitable artists? The complaint offers a motive: Drake’s contract with Universal Music Group is up for renegotiation in 2025, and extending his contract would be costly. [32] Thus, the complaint alleges that by devaluing Drake’s music, UMG could negotiate a cheaper deal to re-sign him. [33] Additionally, “Lamar signed a short-term deal with UMG to see if UMG could prove its value to him – to promote him more effectively than any other music company could – in a compressed timeframe.” [34] According to the lawsuit, Lamar would extend his contract if UMG proved itself. [35]
Drake’s lawsuit could have significant implications for the music industry. If successful, it could set a precedent for how record labels are held accountable for the content they distribute and promote. As the music industry watches closely, artists and labels may reconsider the risks of diss-track culture and the legal ramifications of their distribution decisions.
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Graham v. Universal Music Group, No. 1:25-cv-00399 (S.D.N.Y. January 15, 2025), ECF No. 1.
Complaint, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Complaint at 3–4, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
“Libel Per Se,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/libel_per_se.
Legal Information Institute, "Libel Per Se."
“Defamation,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation.
Complaint at 3, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Kendrick Lamar, “Not Like Us,” Interscope, 2024.
Compl. at 76, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 3, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 23, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 8, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 2, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 67–68, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 71–73, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 21, Graham v. Universal Music Group, No. 1:25-cv-00399 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 2025), ECF No. 24.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
“Clean Hands Doctrine,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clean_hands_doctrine.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Kali Holloway, “When Rap Lyrics Become Incriminating Speech,” The Nation, August 24, 2022, https://www.thenation.com/article/society/rap-lyrics-young-thug/.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Amanda Izes, “Fact Versus Opinion in US Defamation Law: A Corpus and Appraisal Analysis of Speaker Stance Toward Reputational Harm,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 36, no. 3 (June 2023): 1185, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-023-09981-2.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 11, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039, citing Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (N.Y. 1995).
Greenbelt Co-op. Publ. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 12–14, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 12, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039, citing Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415 (App. Div. 2011).
Rapaport v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 2021 WL 1178240, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021).
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 15, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039 [internal citations omitted].
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 14, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 15, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 61–62, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039 [internal citations omitted].
Compl. at 2, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 2, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 21, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.
Compl. at 21, Graham, No. 1:25-cv-0039.