BONG HiTS 4 JESUS: The Symbolic Power of Student Speech Regulation
The phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” is no longer considered protected speech at public schools due to Morse v. Frederick (2007), a Supreme Court case which ruled that suspending a student for sporting a banner with this message was a constitutional act. [1] As a critical case in student speech regulations, the legal implications of Morse reach to First Amendment protections and how they may or may not be infringed upon by educational officials. As a notable restriction on student speech, the decision in this case contributed to extensive debates regarding the Court’s view on the extent to which officials can influence expression in educational environments. [2]
To understand Morse, it is first necessary to briefly trace the path of the student speech precedent that began in 1969. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District cemented the application of the First Amendment's right to the freedom of speech within schools, shielding students' voices from suppression as long as they were not “materially and substantially” disruptive of educational proceedings. [3] In the majority opinion, Justice Abe Fortas famously stated that “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” [4] This guarantee safeguarded students who advocated for change they believed in from the fear of unreasonable retribution by school officials. On a broader scale, it set the protectionist tone of the Court’s interpretation of constitutional freedoms in schools.
The wide scope of Tinker’s protections was reigned in by several subsequent rulings that granted schools greater authority regarding the regulation of student expression. In 1986, Bethel School District v. Fraser enabled restrictions on student speech that is “vulgar and offensive” due to its “[inconsistency] with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.” [5, 6] The Court continued the pattern of clarifying Tinker in 1988 with Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, deciding that schools did not necessarily have to promote particular types of speech that did not align with “the shared values of a civilized social order.” [7] Again, the decision notes that such restrictions can be placed as long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” [8] Though Tinker is a clear protection of civil rights, both Bethel and Hazelwood direct some of this freedom back to the schools and government in the name of protecting educational values and concerns.
Student speech remained relatively untouched from 1988 until 2007, when Joseph Frederick was suspended by his principal, Deborah Morse, after attending a televised Olympic torch rally at which he (along with several peers) sported a large banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” When the case reached the Supreme Court, pro-drug messaging ultimately became another type of speech that schools could constitutionally regulate. [9] Again, the Court emphasized in the majority opinion that this was allowed as it “[posed] a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.” [10] In his concurrence, Justice Alito further clarified the Court’s priority of students' physical safety as it contributed to the outcome of this case. [11]
Many questions were raised about the intent behind and the meaning of “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” both by the Court and by the public. After all, it does not explicitly specify that one should be encouraged to actually take bong hits for Jesus; rather, its absurdity leaves its purpose open to interpretation. What is clear, however, is that in the wake of the decision, concern about the Court’s reach into schools was amplified for many – specifically regarding further constraints on expression in the future. [12] The case thus fueled ongoing debates about whether the Court had found an appropriate balance between school authority and student rights or had taken regulation a step too far and overly infringed upon expression in educational environments.
The increased ability to regulate student speech based on the outcomes of Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse has led to a gradual decline in the scope of First Amendment rights that students in public schools enjoy. However, each of these landmarks has been small and specific – especially Morse itself. After the decision in 2007, Frederick himself successfully avoided repercussions for multiple other accounts of “controversial speech.” Furthermore, on a broader legal scale, speech rights cases often still fall back on the more extensive Tinker standard of protection. [13] The impact of Morse in practice was therefore relatively mild.
It is no secret that “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” is a memorable phrase; this case may be more likely to stand out among other student speech cases because of it. Prominent in debates regarding the issue, Morse is exemplary of a case's potential to impact legal dialogue despite a moderate impact in reality. Ultimately, Morse demonstrates that a case’s legal reach may not be as profound as its contribution to culture as it continues to assist in shaping discussions of the extent of constitutional freedoms in schools.
Sources
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
Kozlowski, D. V., Bullard, M. E., & Deets, K. (2009). Uncertain Rights: Student Speech and Conflicting Interpretations of Morse V. Frederick. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(1), 138-156. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900908600109
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
Ibid.
Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986)
Ibid.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 285 (1988)
Ibid.
Morse v. Frederick
Ibid.
Justin Bathon and Martha McCarthy, “Student Expression: The Uncertain Future” (Educational Horizons 86 no. 2, 2008), 81.
Ibid, 82.
Moss, Scott A. “The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions- for the Law and for the Litigants.” 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1407 (2011). https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/3